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In exchange for modifying the terms of a loan agreement, many 
lenders now require that a debtor prospectively waive the protection 
of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Courts that 
analyze the enforceability of such waivers are forced to address the 
important question of whether a debtor and its creditors should be 
allowed to opt out of such a fundamental provision of the Bankrupt-
cy Code. Currently, the bankruptcy courts are split on the issue of 
whether to enforce pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay. This 
Article explores the rationale for the conflict among the bankruptcy 
courts. It then proposes an approach for resolving this conflict 
consistent with the various important statutory and public policy 
considerations. It argues that courts should enforce pre-petition 
waivers of the automatic stay under limited circumstances. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When filing a petition under the Bankruptcy Code, 1 a debtor gains a 
major benefit in the protection of the automatic stay2 provided in 11 
U.S.C. § 362(a).3 However, as part of a workout agreement,4 a debtor 
may agree to prospectively waive this protection in a subsequent 
bankruptcy petition. Under the former Bankruptcy Act,5 the courts 
clearly enforced such pre-petition agreements.6 However, under the 
current Bankruptcy Code, the courts have split on the issue of whether 
to enforce the agreements. 
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified 
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 344 (codified as amended in various 
sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and 
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3114 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Retiree Benefits 
Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 11 U.S.C.); Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 
2865 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); Crime Control Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 
104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); 
Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); 
and Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
Bankruptcy Code or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). 
2. "The filing of a voluntary, joint, or involuntary petition under any chapter [ of 
the Bankruptcy Code] automatically operates as a stay against lawsuits and lien 
enforcement [against the debtor]." GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 195 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). 
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). 
4. Workout agreements have been defined as 
the treatment of a condition which prevents a company from meeting its 
contractual obligations in the ordinary course, and which requires a readjust-
ment of expectations on the part of those who look to the company for 
performance. All parties are faced with the challenge of working out of the 
difficulty and most nearly achieving their original goals and expectations. This 
requires review and analysis of goals and expectations in light of then-present 
circumstances. 
Donald L. Rome, The Business Workout-A Primer for Participating Creditors, 11 UCC 
L.J. 183, 187 (1979). 
5. Act of July 2, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by Act of Mar. 4, 1938, 
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 84 (repealed 1978). 
6. See, e.g., Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel 
Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 89 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). 
1134 
[VOL. 32: 1133, 1995] Limited Enforceability 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
The issue generally arises when the debtor and the lender enter into 
a workout agreement after the debtor defaults on a loan. Under a typical 
workout agreement, the lender agrees to forbear from foreclosing on the 
debtor's encumbered property. In return, the debtor agrees that, under 
the terms of the workout agreement, a later default, followed by filing 
for protection under the Bankruptcy Code, will entitle the lender to 
immediate relief from the automatic stay.7 
At one end of the spectrum, some bankruptcy courts have taken the 
position that, absent court approval, debtors cannot waive the automatic 
stay protection prior to filing bankruptcy petitions.8 In rejecting the 
agreements, these courts relied on a strict interpretation of the Bankrupt-
cy Code's language, its legislative history,9 general principles of 
contract law,10 and public policy considerations. 11 
At the other end of the spectrum, other bankruptcy courts .have 
enforced pre-petition waiver agreements, believing that the agreements 
7. The following language was used and upheld as a valid pre-petition waiver of 
the automatic stay in In re Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd., No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL 
472592 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1991): 
In the event that Borrower is the subject of any insolvency, bankruptcy, 
receivership, dissolution, reorganization or similar proceeding, federal or state, 
voluntary or involuntary, under any present or future law or act, [L]ender is 
entitled to the automatic and absolute lifting of any automatic stay as to the 
enforcement of its remedies under the Loan Documents against the Security, 
including specifically, but not limited to the stay imposed by Section 362 of 
the United States Federal Bankruptcy Code, as amended; Borrower hereby 
consents to the immediate lifting of any such automatic stay, and will not 
contest any motion by Lender to lift such stay; Borrowing Parties expressly 
acknowledge that (a) there is no equity in the security after consideration of 
the amounts owed Lender and (b) the Security is not now, and will never be 
necessary to any plan of reorganization of any type. 
Id. at *3-4. Another sample of a pre-petition waiver provision of the automatic stay can 
be found in John P. McNicholas, Note, Prepetition Agreements and the Implied Good 
Faith Requirement, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 197, 208 (1993). 
8. E.g., Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 790 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1986), ajf'd 
in part and rev 'din part, 794 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1986); Association of St. Croix Hotel 
Corp., 682 F.2d 446; Yorke v. Citibank Nat'! Ass'n (In re BNT Terminals, Inc.), 125 
B.R. 963 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Sky Group Int'!, Inc., 108 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1989); In re Cafe Partners/Wash. 1983, 81 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1988); In re 
Best Fin. Corp., 74 B.R. 243 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987). 
9. See cases cited infra note 17. 
10. See cases cited infra note 27. 
11. See sources cited infra notes 22-24. 
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justify granting relief to the creditor.12 These courts largely relied on 
the public policy consideration of promoting out-of-court restructurings 
and settlement agreements, 13 an alternate reading of the Bankruptcy 
Code's legislative history, 14 and general principles of contract law.15 
This Article first surveys current case law, analyzing the rationale for 
the conflict among the bankruptcy courts. It then suggests a possible 
approach for resolving this conflict consistent with various important 
statutory and public policy objectives. 
II. RATIONALE FOR REFUSING TO ENFORCE A DEBTOR'S PRE-
PETITION W AIYER OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
A. The Language of the Bankruptcy Code and its Legislative History 
Mandate that Relief from the Automatic Stay Be Approved by the 
Bankruptcy Courts 
One fundamental source bankruptcy courts have used to justify their 
decisions not to enforce a debtor's pre-petition waiver is the language of 
the Bankruptcy Code itself, which specifically grants exclusive power to 
the courts to order relief from the automatic stay. These courts contend 
that, while the former Bankruptcy Act permitted a debtor to waive the 
stay, section 362( d)16 of the current Bankruptcy Code vests the 
bankruptcy courts with the exclusive power to grant relief. 17 
12. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands v. Wieseler (In re Wieseler), 
934 F.2d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners, Ltd., No. 92-
C3955, 1992 WL 381047 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1992), affd, 27 F.3d 1234 (7th Cir. 
1994); In re Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. 599 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995); 
In re Darrell Creek Assocs., L.P., 187 B.R. 908 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995); In re Powers, 170 
B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994); In 
re Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd., No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL 472592 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
Dec. 31, 1991); In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In 
re Aurora Invs., Inc., 134 B.R. 982, 986 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Growers 
Properties No. 56 Ltd., 117 B.R. 1015, 1020 n.2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Citadel 
Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. 275, 276 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Orange Park S. 
Partnership, 79 B.R. 79, 82 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re International Supply Corp. 
ofTampa, Inc., 72 B.R. 510, 511 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Gulf Beach Dev. Corp., 
48 B.R. 40 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (dictum). 
13. See cases cited infra notes 34-42. 
14. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
15. See cases cited infra notes 85-86. 
16. Section 362( d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "[ o ]n request of a party 
in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay 
provided under subsection (a) of this section." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994) (emphasis 
added). 
17. E.g., Maritime Blee. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d 
Cir. 1992) ("Only the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over a debtor's case has the 
1136 
[VOL. 32: 1133, 1995] Limited Enforceability 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Courts have also relied upon the legislative history of Bankruptcy 
Code section 362( d). For example, the Sixth Circuit, after reviewing and 
analyzing the legislative history, found that it "unambiguously identifies 
the bankruptcy court as the exclusive authority to grant relief from 
stay."18 In making its findings, the court emphasized statements made 
by members of the Judiciary Committee. 19 The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that, by granting bankruptcy court judges exclusive power to grant relief, 
Congress implicitly refused to grant the same power to the debtor 
through the mechanism of waiving the protection of the automatic 
stay.20
Other circumstantial evidence of congressional intent not to allow a 
pre-petition waiver includes the absence of express language in the 
Bankruptcy Code authorizing it. Bankruptcy Code section 362( d) 
provides that relief from the automatic stay may be granted for only two 
alternative reasons: for cause, or where the debtor lacks equity in the 
subject property and the property is not necessary for an effective 
reorganization.21 It does not provide for relief from the automatic stay 
where the debtor waives this protection, pre-petition. Thus, the 
authority to grant relief from the stay of judicial proceedings against the debtor."); 
Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711 F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1021 (1986) ("The legislative history of§ 362(d) unambiguously identifies the 
bankruptcy court as the exclusive authority to grant relief from the stay .... "); 
Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 
448 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Under the old Bankruptcy Act, a debtor apparently could waive a 
stay. Under the new Code, relief from a stay must be authorized by the Bankruptcy 
Court .... "); Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 
1982) (Section 362(d) "commits the decision of whether to lift the stay to the discretion 
of the bankruptcy judge."); Farm Credit of Cent. Fla., ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) ("Relief from the automatic stay must be authorized by the 
Bankruptcy Court."); In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1989) ("Although waiver of a stay by the debtor apparently was possible under the old 
Bankruptcy Act, such a waiver is not self-executing under the Bankruptcy Code. Relief 
from stay must be authorized by the Bankruptcy Court."); In re Clark, 69 B.R. 885, 889 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987), modified, 71 B.R. 747 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) ("[T]he stay not 
only may but must be invoked by the court to protect the debtor .... "); In re Related 
Asbestos Cases, 23 B.R. 523, 526 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982) ("[T]he original bankruptcy 
courts alone should have exclusive power to lift an actual stay under section 362."). 
18. Cathey, 711 F.2d at 62. 
19. Id. at 62-63 (citing R.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5973). 
20. Id. at 63; see also Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners, 682 F.2d at 
448; Sky Group, 108 B.R. at 89; Clark, 69 B.R. at 889. 
21. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994). 
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argument concludes, since the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code did not 
include the debtor's waiver of the automatic stay as a basis for granting 
relief, such waivers cannot be grounds for the courts to grant such 
relief.22 
B. A Debtor May Not Waive Pre-Petition the Protection of the 
Automatic Stay Because the Stay is Necessary to Prevent Depletion 
and Dismemberment of the Debtor's Estate and Because the Stay is 
Necessary to Promote Fair Distribution of the Estate's Assets to the 
Unsecured Creditors 
Bankruptcy courts have used two additional reasons to hold that a 
debtor may not waive the automatic stay: avoiding an inefficient 
depletion of the estate's assets, and preventing an inequitable distribution 
of the estate's assets. To support their reasoning, the courts again 
looked to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, focusing 
particularly on the House Report: 
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain 
creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's 
property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in 
preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed 
to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated 
equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents 
that.23 
Since the automatic stay provision is designed to protect and treat all 
creditors equally, and promote orderly liquidation or reorganization 
procedures, with the ultimate goal of maximizing the estate's value, these 
courts argue that they should not lift it simply because the debtor elected 
to waive the protection it afforded him.24 
22. Some courts use a similar rationale in refusing to enforce a debtor's waiver of 
other bankruptcy protections. In In re Levinson, the bankruptcy court explained that 
"[t]he general rule is that all debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy unless specifically 
excepted by the Bankruptcy Code provisions." Klingman v. Levinson (In re Levinson), 
58 B.R. 831, 837 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1986), ajf'd, 66 B.R. 831 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986), 
ajf'd, 831 F .2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1987). The court then noted that the statutory exceptions 
to a discharge do not include contractual waivers of a discharge. Id. Therefore, the 
judge concluded that a debtor may not waive the right to a bankruptcy discharge. Id. 
On the other hand, one may argue that since Congress enacted special provisions under 
§ 524 of the Bankruptcy Code to protect a debtor from waiving the discharge of a debt 
and since Congress did not enact similar safeguard provisions for a debtor's waiver of 
the automatic stay rights, Congress has demonstrated an intent to allow and tolerate a 
debtor's pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay protection. 
23. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297. 
24. See Maritime Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 
1992), .where the court stated: 
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[T]he stay protects creditors by preventing particular creditors from acting 
unilaterally in self-interest to obtain payment from a debtor to the detriment 
of other creditors . . . . 
. . . Because the automatic stay serves the interests of both debtors and 
creditors, it may not be waived and its scope may not be limited by a debtor. 
Id. at 1204. Similarly, in Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners, the court held: 
Under the new [Bankruptcy] Code, relief from a stay must be authorized by 
the Bankruptcy Court to prevent certain creditors from gaining a preference for 
their claims against the debtor; to forestall the depletion of the debtor's assets 
due to legal costs in defending proceedings against it; and, in general, to avoid 
interference with the orderly liquidation or rehabilitation of the debtor. 
Because it is the bankruptcy judge who is the most knowledgeable about the 
debtor's affairs, and about the effect that any judicial proceeding would have 
on the debtor's reorganization, it is essential that he make the determination 
as to whether an action against the debtor may proceed or whether the stay 
against such actions should remain in effect. 
Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners, 682 F.2d at 448. In Yorke v. Citibank 
Nat'l Ass'n, the court stated: _ 
It is well accepted that the automatic stay not only protects the debtor's 
attempt to repay his debts or reorganize . . . but it also protects creditors by 
preventing dismemberment of the estate. Purposely, the automatic stay 
maintains the status quo, to ensure orderly distribution of estate assets, and, 
more importantly, facilitate the administration of the estate by allowing the 
court to resolve claims and distribute assets in accord with priorities 
recognized in the Code. 
Yorke v. Citibank Nat'! Ass'n (In re BNT Terminals, Inc.), 125 B.R. 963, 971 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1990). In In re Clark, the court noted: 
[The automatic stay] is necessary not only to protect the debtor, but also to 
protect the equal treatment and distribution of the debtor's assets, where 
appropriate, among all creditors . . . . Hence, the stay not only may but must 
be invoked by the court to protect the debtor-and the principle of equal 
treatment of all creditors . . . . 
Clark, 69 B.R. at 889. In In re Sky Group lnt'l, Inc., the court held that 
[t]o grant a creditor relief from stay simply because the debtor elected to 
waive the protection afforded the debtor by the automatic stay ignores the fact 
that it also is designed to protect all creditors and to treat them equally. The 
orderly liquidation procedure contemplated by the Code would be placed in 
jeopardy .... 
. . . [S]uch a waiver is not self-executing under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Sky Group, 108 B.R. at 89. See also S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv., 
Inc. (In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc.), 817 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1987) ("In a chapter 11 
reorganization proceeding, the stay prevents the dissipation or diminution of the 
bankrupt's assets while rehabilitative efforts are undertaken .... "); Tringali v. 
Hathaway Mach. Co., Inc., 796 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1986) ('"The purpose of this 
section [362] . . . is . . . to preclude one creditor from pursuing a remedy to the 
disadvantage of other creditors .... '") ( quoting A.H. Robbins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin (In 
re A.H. Robbins Co., Inc.), 788 F.2d 994, .998 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 
(1986)); Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Cir.), ajf'd in 
part and rev'd in part, 794 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Since the purpose of the stay is 
to protect creditors, as well as the debtor, the debtor may not waive the automatic 
1139 
Since those creditors who are not privy to the pre-petition waiver 
agreement may benefit from the application of the automatic stay, 
judicial enforcement of the waiver may harm them. For example, a 
junior under-secured creditor in a real estate transaction may find that 
postponing foreclosure of the subject real property will enhance the 
chances of obtaining a full or, at the very least, a greater repayment of 
debt. It may be too risky or simply not cost-effective to protect only a 
limited equity in the property at the foreclosure sale. Therefore, the 
under-secured creditor may conclude that the best chance to maximize 
the recovery on the unsecured portion of the debt and to increase the 
value of the equity in the property would lie in letting the debtor 
continue operating the property under bankruptcy protection for some 
period of time. The creditor would hope that, under bankruptcy 
protection, the debtor would be able to effectively reorganize, improve 
the property's cash flow (thereby potentially increasing its value), and 
repay some, if not all, of the unsecured portion of the debt. In such a 
situation, judicially enforcing the pre-petition agreement between the 
debtor and the senior over-secured creditor may substantially harm the 
junior creditor's interests. In the absence of the protection of the 
automatic stay, the senior over-secured creditor could foreclose on its 
stay."); Farm Credit of Cent. Fla., ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1993) ("Since the purpose of the stay is to protect the creditors, as well as [the debtor, 
the debtor] could not have unilaterally waived the automatic stay against the interest of 
his creditors."); In re Cafe Partners/Wash. 1983, 81 B.R. 175, 181 (Bankr. D.D.C. 
1988); In re Best Fin. Corp., 74 B.R. 243, 245 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987) ("A debtor cannot 
waive the automatic stay, since the purpose of its enactment by Congress was not only 
to protect debtors and creditors, but also to provide an 'orderly and efficient administra-
tion of a bankruptcy estate."') ( quoting Olsen v. Deutscher (In re Nashville White 
Trucks, Inc.), 22 B.R. 578 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982)); Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan 
Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1981) ("[The stay] shields creditors from one another by replacing 'race' and other 
preferential systems of debt collection with a more equitable and orderly distribution of 
assets."). See generally Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic 
Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 99 (1995). 
Rasmussen and Skeel write: 
Id. 
Although the waiver may make sense as between the parties who agreed to it, 
other creditors may not have any idea that the debtor has relinquished its right 
to the automatic stay. For these creditors, the waiver imposes significant costs. 
Most important, the debtor's promise to give up its principal creditor's 
collateral may sacrifice the benefits of any collective proceeding .... If other 
creditors knew that the debtor had agreed to a stay waiver, they could adjust 
their relationship with the debtor accordingly (perhaps, by monitoring more 
closely or insisting on more restrictive credit terms). What makes waivers in 
existing agreements particularly problematic is the element of secrecy and the 
costs they impose on other creditors. 
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lien, wipe out the junior under-secured creditor's limited equity in the 
subject real property, and end any prospect of dividends arising out of 
the debtor's potentially successful reorganization. 
This exercise of a single creditor's remedies creates an inefficient 
result detrimental to the collective group of creditors. To prevent this, 
some courts refuse to enforce the debtor's pre-petition waiver and opt to 
impose the collective and compulsory proceedings to make the diverse 
individuals act as one. This collective proceeding results in a net gain 
for all the creditors by ensuring that, individually, they cannot pick apart 
the estate's assets through piecemeal liquidation. It also helps guarantee 
fair and equal treatment for all creditors, not just those who are party to 
a pre-petition waiver agreement. 
C. A Debtor May Not Waive Pre-Petition the Protection of the 
Automatic Stay Because Such a Waiver Is Against Public Policy 
Courts have also been reluctant to enforce pre-petition waivers because 
they do not want to deprive a debtor of the opportunity to attempt a 
reorganization. They point out that, in addition to protecting the relative 
position of creditors, the drafters of the Code designed the automatic 
stay to provide the debtor with enough time to attempt to reorganize 
without the creditors' pressure and interference.25 The drafters charac-
terized this protection as: 
one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It 
gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection 
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to 
25. Maritime Elec. Co., Inc., 959 F.2d at 1204; see also Stringer v. Huet (In re 
Stringer), 847 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1988) ("In addition to protecting the relative 
position of creditors, [the automatic stay] was designed to shield the debtor from 
financial pressure during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding."); Tringali, 796 
F.2d at 562. One court opined: 
[T]he Bankruptcy Court's holding that prepetition agreements providing for the 
lifting of the stay are "not per se binding on the debtor, as a public policy 
position," is consistent with the purposes of the automatic stay to protect the 
debtor's assets, provide temporary relief from creditors and promote equality 
of distribution among the creditors by forestalling a race to the court house. 
Farm Credit of Cent. Fla., 160 B.R. at 873. See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'! v. 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 105 B.R. 765, 771 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1989); Yorke, 125 B.R. at 971; Sky Group, 108 B.R. at 88; Cafe Partners, 81 
B.R. at 181. 
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attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the 
financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. 26 
Based on this legislative history, courts held that allowing a creditor to 
proceed against a debtor pursuant to a pre-petition waiver of the 
automatic stay effectively takes away the fundamental protection of the 
mandated breathing spell.27 
Courts have also suggested that depriving the debtor of the Bankruptcy 
Code's most fundamental protection amounts to a waiver of the right to 
file bankruptcy altogether. Since a waiver of that sort violates the 
Bankruptcy Code's public policy underpinnings, courts analogously 
refused to enforce a pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay.28 
D. A Pre-Petition Waiver of the Automatic Stay Entered Between the 
Debtor and One Creditor Is Not Enforceable Because It Fails to 
Include All the Necessary Parties 
Very often, only one of the creditors is party to a pre-petition waiver 
agreement. In the absence of pre-petition waivers by all creditors of the 
estate, courts have held such agreements unenforceable because they are 
26. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97; see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5787 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97. 
27. See Yorke, 125 B.R. at 971: 
[T]he automatic stay ... protects the debtor's attempt to repay his debts or 
reorganize his financial affairs by giving the debtor a respite from creditor 
demands .... The court will not tolerate unauthorized acts by debtors ... 
[by] facilitating the exercise of control over, or permitting the dismemberment 
of property of the estate outside the provisions of the Code. To do so would 
make a nullity of § 362 and what it attempts to accomplish as well as invite 
horrendous fraud upon the court. 
Id. See also Maritime Elec. Co., Inc., 959 F.2d at 1204 ("The automatic stay ... gives 
a bankrupt a breathing spell from creditors by stopping all collection efforts, all 
harassment, and all foreclosure actions . . . . Because the automatic stay serves the 
interests of both debtors and creditors, it may not be waived .... "); Farm Credit of 
Cent. Fla., 160 B.R. at 873 ("It is the opinion of this Court that the Bankruptcy Court's 
holding that prepetition agreements providing for the lifting of the stay are 'not per se 
binding on the debtor, as a public policy position,' is consistent with the purposes of the 
automatic stay to protect the debtor's assets .... "); Cafe Partners, 81 B.R. at 181-82 
(The automatic stay "gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors .... [S]ince 
the purpose of the stay is to protect creditors as well as the debtor, the debtor may not 
waive the automatic stay."). 
28. See, e.g., Clark, 69 B.R. at 889 ("[T]he automatic stay is one of the most 
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws .... "); In re Jenkins 
Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 181 B.R. 33, 36-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); see also 
Peter S. Partee, The Enforceability of Pre-Petition Waivers of a Debtor's Rights Under 
The Automatic Stay, 1992 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 5, 8. 
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not binding on the other non-party creditors who are intended beneficia-
ries of the automatic stay.29 
This holding is based on the rationale that creditors are also congres-
sionally designated beneficiaries of the automatic stay, allowing them to 
invoke its protection despite the debtor's waiver.30 The legislative 
history specifically states that the automatic stay provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides protection to both the debtor and to the 
estate's creditors.31 As such, a waiver of the automatic stay by the 
debtor cannot be enforced unless the other creditors, also intended 
beneficiaries of the stay's protection, waive the protection as well. A 
waiver· would be ineffective unless all of the debtor's creditors 
consent.32 Thus, a pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay entered 
between the debtor and one creditor may be objected to by any other 
creditor because, as beneficiaries of the automatic stay provision, they 
have the standing to object.33 
29. See, e.g., Farm Credit of Cent. Fla., 160 B.R. at 873-74: 
The automatic stay provision is intended to preclude the opportunity of one 
bankruptcy creditor to pursue a remedy against the debtor to the disadvantage 
of the other bankruptcy creditors .... No other creditors were involved in the 
prepetition agreement, nor did the Bankruptcy court approve this agreement. 
. . . The Bankruptcy Court correctly determined that the agreement to waive 
the automatic stay was not self-executing. 
Id. See also Sky Group, I 08 B.R. at 89 ("To grant a creditor relief from stay simply 
because the debtor elected to waive the protection afforded the debtor by the automatic 
stay ignores the fact that it also is designed to protect all creditors and to treat them 
equally."); Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Cir.), ajf'd in 
part and rev'd in part, 794 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Since the purpose of the stay is 
to protect creditors as well as the debtor, the debtor may not waive the automatic stay."). 
30. See In re Clark, 69 B.R. 885 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
31. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297 ("The automatic stay also provides creditor protection."); see 
also S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv., Inc. (In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc.), 
817 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1987). 
32. See Partee, supra note 28, at 8. 
33. Some courts have also indicated that, when needed, they have the duty to 
invoke the automatic stay provision sua sponte even when neither the debtor nor any 
other creditor has raised the issue. See, e.g., Clark, 69 B.R. at 889 ("[T]he stay not only 
may but must be invoked by the court to protect the debtor-and the principle of equal 
treatment of all creditors .... "). 
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III. THE RATIONALE FOR ENFORCING A DEBTOR'S PRE-PETITION 
W AIYER OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
A. A Debtor's Pre-Petition Waiver of the Automatic Stay Is Binding 
Upon All Creditors of the Estate Because Only the Debtor Has 
Standing to Invoke the Protection of the Automatic Stay 
Other courts have upheld pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay 
based on agreements between the debtor and only one creditor. They 
have taken the position that, since only the debtor may invoke the 
protection of the automatic stay, the debtor's pre-petition waiver of the 
protection must also bind all other creditors. Consequently, creditors 
have no standing to object to the enforcement of the pre-petition 
waiver.34 
These courts reason that, though creditors may be incidental beneficia-
ries of the automatic stay, they "are afforded no substantive or procedur-
al rights under [section 362] of the Bankruptcy Code"35 and thus may 
not invoke the automatic stay to protect their interests. As a result, 
creditors cannot effectively oppose the enforcement of the debtor's pre-
petition waiver of the automatic stay protection. 
B. A Debtor's Pre-Petition Waiver of the Automatic Stay Should Be 
Enforced Because It Does Not Violate Public Policy As It Does Not 
Amount to a Waiver of the Debtor's Right to File for Bankruptcy 
Protection 
Some bankruptcy courts enforce pre-petition waiver agreements of the 
automatic stay by reasoning that such an agreement does not violate 
public policy because it does not prohibit the debtor from actually filing 
34. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. James (In re Brooks), 79 B.R. 479,481 (Bankr. 
9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 871 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Magnoni v. Globe Inv. & 
Loan Co., Inc. (In re Globe Inv. & Loan Co., Inc.,), 867 F.2d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1989) 
("The appellees argued, and the district court concluded, that section 362 is intended 
solely for the benefit of the debtor['s] estate. The appellees' position is supported by 
the majority of the courts which have considered standing under section 362."); Bryce 
v. Stivers (In re Stivers), 31 B.R. 735, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ca. 1983) ("I conclude that the 
automatic stay operates in favor of debtors and estates (represented by trustees and 
debtors-in-possession) only and that it gives junior lienholders and other parties 
interested in the property affected by the automatic stay no substantive or procedural 
rights."); Hodsell v. Estate of Fuel Oil Supply and Terminaling, Inc. (In re Fuel Oil 
Supply and Terminaling, Inc.), 30 B.R. 360, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) ("The 
automatic stay is for the benefit of the debtor and if it chooses to ignore stay violations 
other parties cannot use such violations to their advantage."). 
35. Brooks, 79 B.R. at 481. See also cases cited supra note 34. 
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a bankruptcy petition. The case of In re Club Tower L.P.36 addresses 
the question of whether a pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay 
amounts to a waiver of the right to file a bankruptcy petition. The court 
held that while a pre-petition waiver of the right to file bankruptcy was 
unenforceable because it was against public policy, a pre-petition waiver 
of the automatic stay is not against public policy and is therefore 
enforceable.37 The court reasoned that a pre-petition waiver of the 
automatic stay is significantly different than an agreement prohibiting the 
debtor from filing a bankruptcy petition altogether.38 
The court first pointed out the obvious: agreeing not to contest a 
motion for relief from the automatic stay does not stop the debtor from 
filing for bankruptcy relief.39 Moreover, by agreeing not to contest 
relief from the automatic stay, the debtor waives only a single benefit of 
the Bankruptcy Code and does not waive the remaining protection 
conferred on the debtor by the Bankruptcy Code.40 Unlike when a 
borrower waives the right to file a bankruptcy petition altogether, a pre-
petition waiver of the automatic stay still leaves the debtor with the 
benefits . . . as to other creditors, as well as all the other benefits and 
protections provided by the Bankruptcy Code including but not limited to the 
right to conduct an orderly liquidation, discharge debt or pay it back on 
different terms, assume or reject executory contracts, sell property free and clear 
of liens, and pursue preferences and fraudulent conveyance claims. Debtor still 
retains the core rights under the Bankruptcy Code and has the ability to make 
a "fresh start." 41 
Thus, the court concluded that pre-petition waiver agreements are 
enforceable because they do not raise the same public policy concerns 
as does a pre-petition waiver of the right to file for bankruptcy protection. 42 
36. 138 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991). 
37. Id. at 312. 
38. Id. at 311-12. 
39. Id. at 311. 
40. Id. at 311-12. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 312. See In re Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd., No. 91-81065HR, 1991 
WL 472592 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1991): 
To permit [the secured creditor] to enforce its [pre-petition waiver provision 
of the automatic stay entered with the debtor] does not violate public policy. 
Debtor at all times was free to file in the bankruptcy court. The agreement in 
question only impacts debtor and one of its creditors .... Debtor has all the 
protection of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to all its other creditors. In 
other words, 11 U.S.C. § 362 is still in effect as to them. Also, debtor may 
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C. Enforcing a Debtor's Pre-Petition Waiver of the Automatic Stay, 
As Part of a Workout Agreement, Furthers the Legitimate Public 
Policy of Encouraging Out-Of-Court Restructurings and Settlements 
The most powerful rationale put forth by courts in enforcing pre-
petition waivers is that they advance the important public policy of 
promoting out-of-court workouts and settlement agreements.43 Some 
courts have viewed the policy of encouraging out-of-court workouts as 
an overriding objective of the Bankruptcy Code. In analyzing relevant 
legislative history, one court concluded that "Congress designed the 
[Bankruptcy] Code, in large measure, to encourage workouts in the first 
instance, with refuge in bankruptcy as a last resort."44 The In re 
Colonial Ford court attached importance to the legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Code that stated: '"Most business arrangements, that is, 
extensions or compositions (reduction) of debts, occur out-of-court. The 
out-of-court procedure, sometimes known as a common law composition, 
is quick and inexpensive . . . . When an out-of-court arrangement is 
inadequate to rehabilitate a business, the bankruptcy laws provide an 
alternative. "'45 
Congress had at least three strong reasons for promoting pre-
petition workouts. First, a workout is expeditious. Debtors and creditors 
file a plan of liquidation or reorganization in this pending Chapter 11, or 
convert and discharge all its debts in a Chapter 7 proceeding, assume or reject 
its executory contracts in Chapter 11, sell property free and clear of liens, and 
prosecute preference actions and fraudulent conveyance claims. In other 
words, notwithstanding enforcement of the [pre-petition waiver of the 
automatic stay], debtor has all the rights afforded by the bankruptcy code as 
to any other creditor. Thus, there is no violation of public policy by enforcing 
the [pre-petition waiver] agreement. 
Id. at *5-6. See also In re Darrell Creek Assocs., L.P., 187 B.R. 908, 913 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1995) ("[A] waiver of stay is different from, and not equivalent to, a waiver of 
the right to file bankruptcy."); In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 818-19 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) 
(pre-petition agreements to waive the automatic stay "are distinguishable from an 
agreement which precluded the debtor from filing a bankruptcy petition in that the debtor 
has elected to forego only a single benefit of the Bankruptcy Code in exchange for the 
creditor's forbearance."). 
43. Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd. at *2 ("[T]his court agrees with movant's 
argument that to enforce the [pre-petition waiver of the stay] agreement would further 
the legitimate public policy of encouraging out of court restructurings and settlements."); 
see also Cheeks, 167 B.R. at 819 ("Perhaps the most compelling reason for enforcement 
of the forbearance agreement is to further the public policy in favor of encouraging out 
of court restructuring and settlements."); In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 312 
(Bankr. N.D. Ca. 1991) ("[E]nforcing pre-petition settlement agreements furthers the 
legitimate public policy of encouraging out of court restructurings and settlements."). 
44. In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1015 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). 
45. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179-80). 
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enjoy a substantially greater flexibility in a workout arrangement than in 
a bankruptcy context. The flexibility in a workout setting results in 
quicker dispute resolution and in fewer delays. On the other hand, the 
bankruptcy mechanism can be "' a very time-consuming and hydraheaded 
kind of delaying structure' which 'frequently works to the detriment of 
creditors. "'46 It is the most expensive element in any bankruptcy 
proceeding, and can best be avoided by a pre-petition workout agree-
ment.47 
Second, workouts are cost-effective. They avoid the costs of delays 
generally associated with a bankruptcy proceeding.48 They also avoid 
the inevitable superstructure of reorganization and its related costs, 
including those of trustees, creditors' committees, and their professional 
representatives. These direct costs of reorganization are estimated to 
range from three to twenty-five percent of a debtor's value.49 
In addition to direct costs of reorganization under the Bankruptcy 
Code, a debtor may incur indirect opportunity and uncertainty costs. 
Opportunity costs result from management's down-time. As manage-
ment of the debtor-in-possession concentrates its efforts in reorganizing, 
it "may have few resources [and little time] to expend on the debtor's 
business operations. The uncertainty costs emerge from the doubts 
reorganization raises about the firm's ultimate survival. Reorganization 
46. Id. at 1016 (quoting Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1977) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]). 
47. Id. 
48. Marcia B. Pine & Paul L. Alpern, Pre-Bankruptcy Automatic Stay Agreements, 
L.A. LAW., Sept. 1993, at 28 ("Single-asset bankruptcies are expensive .... [I]t is not 
uncommon for a debtor with a troubled, depreciating asset to remain in bankruptcy for 
a year or more."). 
49. See, e.g., DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, 
PROCESS, REFORM 176 (1971) (estimate costs at about 25%); Jerold B. Warner, 
Bankruptcy, Absolute Priority, and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 
239,271 (1977) (legal costs ofrailroad bankruptcies are about five percent of the market 
value of the firm at the time of bankruptcy); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: 
Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285,286 (1990) (costs 
estimated at about three percent under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). While the 
first two studies supra examine and analyze the costs of bankruptcies prior to the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the process of court-supervised negotiations among 
claimants was fundamentally the same then as it is now. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 36 (2d ed. 
1990) ("A new Bankruptcy Code was passed by Congress in 1978 ... [codifying] ... 
many of the judicial developments in bankruptcy law."). 
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often creates uncertainty about whether or to what extent the debtor will 
continue as a going concern. "50 This uncertainty may result in a loss 
of key employees and may contribute to wasteful or excessive precau-
tionary behavior.51 
Additionally, reorganization under bankruptcy protection is costly 
because creditors do not have perfect information at their disposal, which 
gives them an incentive to engage in strategic behavior. Bankruptcy 
proceedings would be much more efficient and inexpensive if each 
interested party had all the relevant information relating to the debtor's 
estate, including the real value of the debtor's assets, the real amount of 
its own claim, and the priority of its own claim. However, in reality, 
claimants and equity holders often heavily litigate over these factors and 
have incentives to engage in strategic behavior even if they understand 
their legal rights. 52 "These reorganization battles and bargains impose 
both direct and indirect costs on a debtor. And while not all these costs 
are properly attributable to bankruptcy reallocation, most probably 
are."53 
Moreover, reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code may destroy the 
debtor's essential business relationships, which the debtor often 
desperately needs to keep the business afloat. For example, once a 
debtor-manufacturer commences a bankruptcy petition, customers may 
become reluctant to do business with her because she may not survive 
to honor product warranties.54 Another type of debtor in a similar 
position is the lessor who cannot guarantee the habitability of its 
premises.55 
In general, sales will slow and the debtor may be forced to cut 
prices.56 The debtor may have difficulty finding supplies. If he does, 
his credit costs may substantially increase.57 Likewise, upon commenc-
ing a bankruptcy petition, '"the debtor's own debtors often decline to 
pay as they would have in the ordinary course, suddenly reporting that 
the dresses were the wrong size, were the wrong color, or were not 
50. Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy And Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 
465 (1992). For further discussion of how uncertainty in the outcome of bankruptcy 
proceedings affects costs, see David C. Webb, The Importance Of Information 
Explaining The Existence Of Costly Bankruptcy, 54 ECONOMICA 279 (1987). 
51. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On The Nature Of Bankruptcy: An 
Essay On Bankruptcy Sharing And the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 199· 
(1989). 
52. Adler, supra note 50, at 464-65. 
53. Id. 
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ordered. "'58 Similarly, "accounts receivable can deteriorate to an 
unbelievable extent as soon as word gets around that the debtor is 
headed for the cemetery."59 Such direct and indirect costs can signifi-
cantly impede the debtor's prospects for an effective bankruptcy 
reorganization. However, if the debtor and her creditors can reach an 
out-of-court workout, and the debtor thus never files a bankruptcy 
petition, she can largely minimize these impediments and costs. 
That reorganization through a consensual workout agreement simply 
makes more business sense than reorganization through a bankruptcy 
proceeding presents the third primary reason to promote out-of-court 
workouts. Out-of-court restructurings require cooperation and good faith 
from all the involved parties. "The alternative is litigation [in the 
bankruptcy courts] and its bedfellows-bluff, petti-foggery, and strife. 
Moreover, the parties who are 'on site,' and prepared by education or 
experience, are more able than a judge, ill-equipped in resources and 
training, to rescue a beleaguered corporation."6° Furthermore, "[t]he 
courtroom is not a boardroom. The judge is not a business consul-
tant. "61 The problems of insolvency, for the most part, are matters for 
extra-judicial resolution, calling for "business not legal judgment."62 
Recognizing the benefits of pre-petition workout agreements, the 
Bankruptcy Code's authors promoted the policy of pre-petition workout 
agreements in at least two ways. First, they structured the Code to 
provide incentives to both debtors and creditors to enter into workout 
agreements and not to resort to bankruptcy. By themselves, the Code 
provisions may force the creditor and the debtor to enter into negotia-
tions for mutual accommodations which would result in a consensual 
workout agreement, and the need to file a bankruptcy petition would be 
eliminated.63 For example, a creditor should consider the possibility 
that recovering on a judgment will be meaningless if a bankruptcy 
58. Id. (quoting Peter F. Coogan et al., Comments on Some Reorganization 
Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. 1149, 1155 (1975)). 
59. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 483 (1975) (testimony by Peter F. Coogan) [hereinafter House 
Hearings]. 
60. Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. at 1016. 
61. In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). 
62. Id. 
63. House Hearings, supra note 59, at 396. 
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pet1t10n ensues. Preference law will void the recovery.64 Similarly, a 
debtor "may not break faith with creditors by preferring some over 
others, or by secreting assets, lest they file an involuntary petition."65 
Second, the Bankruptcy Code's drafters promoted out-of-court 
consensual workout agreements by providing, under certain conditions, 
a binding effect to a pre-petition workout agreement in a subsequently 
filed bankruptcy case. Under certain conditions, Bankruptcy Code 
section 1102(b )(1) allows a pre-petition creditors' committee to function 
as the official committee66 in the bankruptcy case.67 Likewise, section 
1126(b) endorses pre-petition acceptance of pre-packaged plans68 in 
some circumstances.69 Congress specified that acceptance of a plan of 
reorganization "obtained before the commencement of the filing may be 
counted in the voting if there was adequate prepetition disclosure and, 
if necessary, 'compliance with any applicable non-bankruptcy law 
governing the adequacy of disclosure. "'70 Indeed, incentives to use 
"prepackaged plans" are "'written all through the new [Bankruptcy 
Code]. "'71 
64. Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. at 1017 (relying on House Hearings, supra note 
59, at 394-97, 490-91). 
65. Id. 
66. The Bankruptcy Code requires the U.S. Trustee to appoint a committee 
consisting of creditors holding unsecured claims as soon as practicable after the filing 
of the Chapter 11 petition. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 750-51 (1993). A 
committee ordinarily consists of those persons holding the seven largest claims or 
amounts of equity securities against the estate. Id. 
67. BankruptcyReformActof1978, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1)(1994)("Acommittee 
of creditors shall ... ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the 
seven largest claims . . . or of the members of a committee organized by creditors 
before the commencement . . . if such committee was fairly chosen, and is representative 
.... "); see also Colonial Ford, Inc. 24 B.R. at 1017. 
68. A prepackaged Chapter 11 plan of reorganization is a plan proposed and 
accepted out of court by all classes of impaired creditors and shareholders prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case. As long as the solicitation of votes is conducted 
in accordance with applicable non-bankruptcy law, the acceptances obtained prior to the 
filing may be used after the commencement of the bankruptcy case to consummate a 
plan of reorganization under the authority of the bankruptcy court. See LAWRENCE P. 
KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1126.02 {15th ed. 1995). 
69. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1994); see also 
Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. at 1017. 
70. Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. at 1017 (quoting J. Ronald Trost, Business 
Reorganization Under Chapter II of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus. LAW. 1309, 
1325 (1979)). 
71. Id. (quoting Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-
Employment-for-Lawyers Bill, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 1, 38). As the congressional sponsors 
of the Bankruptcy Code stated: 
One cannot overemphasize the advantages of speed and simplicity to both 
creditors and debtors. Chapter XI allows a debtor to negotiate a plan outside 
of court and, having reached a settlement with a majority in number and 
amount of each class of creditors, permits the debtor to bind all unsecured 
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By providing binding effect to certain pre-pet1t10n consensual 
workouts, the Bankruptcy Code's sponsors clearly demonstrated 
favoritism toward pre-petition workout agreements as an alternative to 
bankruptcy proceedings.72 Those courts· enforcing pre-petition waivers 
have taken this implicit legislative intent to heart, while also recognizing 
the significant benefits of out-of-court pre-petition workout agreements. 
In In re Club Tower L.P., 73 the debtor defaulted on a loan secured by 
real property. As a result of this default, the lender and the debtor 
entered into a workout agreement under which the debtor's debt was 
restructured. In addition to restructuring the payment schedule, the 
lender agreed not to pursue foreclosure proceedings against the debtor 
as long as payments called for under the workout agreement were kept 
current. In return, the debtor promised to waive the protection of the 
automatic stay. The debtor later defaulted under the workout agreement, 
commenced bankruptcy proceedings, and invoked the protection of the 
automatic stay. The lender then moved for relief from the automatic 
stay under section 362(d)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code on the basis of the 
debtor's pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay.74 
Siding with the lender, the court enforced the pre-petition waiver 
because enforcement "furthers the legitimate public policy of encourag-
ing out of court restructurings and settlements."75 The court found that 
the Bankruptcy Code "recognizes that the filing of a bankruptcy petition 
might not always be the most efficient means of restructuring the 
relations of a debtor and its creditors."76 The court concluded that pre-
petition workouts among debtors and creditors should be promoted.77 
"In order to facilitate this goal, the pre-petition agreements should be 
creditors to the terms of the arrangement. From the perspective of creditors, 
early confirmation of a plan of arrangement: first, generally reduces 
administrative expenses which have priority over the claims of unsecured 
creditors; second, permits creditors to receive prompt distribution on their 
claims with respect to which interest does not accrue after the filing date; and 
third, increases the ultimate recovery on creditor claims by minimizing the 
adverse effect on the business which often accompanies efforts to operate an 
enterprise under the protection of the Bankruptcy Act. 
124 CONG. REC. H32405 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978). 
72. See 124 CONG. REC. H32405 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978). 
73. 138 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991). 
74. Id. at 308-09. 




enforced against a borrower who later files for bankruptcy. To hold 
otherwise would make lenders more reticent in attempting workouts with 
borrowers outside of bankruptcy."78 
Courts have also enforced pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay 
to encourage lenders to enter into pre-petition workout agreements.79 
In doing so, the courts attempted to minimize the lender's risks 
stemming from pre-petition workout agreements and thereby encourage 
other lenders to enter into such agreements in the future. 80 Otherwise, 
lenders could make concessions, sincerely bargained for, as part of a 
workout agreement. Courts could then alter those concessions in the 
debtor's subsequent Chapter 11 petition. Such a scenario would make 
the debtor's promise in the pre-bankruptcy workout phase-to avoid 
filing a bankruptcy petition in return for bargained changes to the loan 
agreement-imaginary at best.81 The lender's purpose of avoiding the 
debtor's bankruptcy by consenting to liberalize the terms of the 
underlying loan would be meaningless if, after entering into a formal 
restructuring agreement, the debtor "could file a bankruptcy petition and 
obtain a stay of the lender's bargained-for right to foreclosure and extort 
even more concessions to which the lender would not have agreed 
outside of bankruptcy."82 
"These severe uncertainties and risks cause many lenders to reject 
workout attempts and seek foreclosure, knowing that if bankruptcy is 
78. Id. See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Springpark Assocs. (In re Springpark Assocs.), 
623 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980): 
"The authority of a trial court to enter a judgment enforcing a settlement 
agreement has as its foundation the policy favoring the amicable adjustment 
of disputes and the concomitant avoidance of costly and time consuming 
litigation." ... [A] contrary result would tend to encourage delays similar to 
this one in future bankruptcy proceedings and discourage the use of settle-
ments. 
Id. at 1380 (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978)). See 
also In re Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd., No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL 472592 (N.D. Ga. 
Dec. 31, 1991): 
[T]his court agrees with movant's argument that to enforce the agreement 
would further the legitimate public policy of encouraging out of court 
restructurings and settlements. In situations such as this, i.e., a dispute 
between essentially two parties over a single real estate asset, workouts and 
restructurings should be encouraged between market-wise, equally knowledge-
able commercial entities. If the court were not to enforce this agreement it 
would send the wrong signal to the market place. 
Id. at *2. 
79. Pine & Alpern, supra note 48, at 31 (citing In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 
307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Aurora Invs., Inc., 144 B.R. 899 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1992)). 
80. Pine & Alpern, supra note 48, at 31, 60. 
81. Id. at 31. 
82. Id. at 30-31. 
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filed, at least the lender has not bid against itself by entering into 
prepetition settlement or workout agreements. "83 Thus, 
[u]nless the borrower enters into an enforceable stipulation that the lender will 
have relief from the automatic stay should the borrower later file for bankrupt-
cy-a prepetition automatic stay relief provision--the borrower will not have 
truly shared the risks and concessions that the borrower is asking the lender to 
make in a workout agreement. 84 
In other words, pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay as part of a 
comprehensive pre-petition workout agreement helps assure a secured 
creditor that the debtor is acting in good faith. By enforcing the pre-
petition waiver of the automatic stay, courts can help minimize the 
secured creditor's risks and reduce the possibility of the debtor's abuse 
of a pre-petition workout agreement. In doing so, the courts make it 
more likely that lenders will feel confident when entering into the much-
valued workout agreements. 
D. Enforcing a Debtors Pre-Petition Waiver of the Automatic Stay 
As Part of a Workout Agreement Furthers the Legitimate Public 
Policy of Enforcing Otherwise Valid Contracts 
Judicial enforcement of pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay also 
promotes the vital public policy interest of recognizing otherwise valid 
contracts. The legal system has always recognized the enormous socio-
economic contributions of valid contracts by consistently enforcing 
them.85 
Following this rationale, a number of bankruptcy courts have 
approved private agreements, entered into prior to the debtor filing a 
bankruptcy petition, that call for the waiver of the automatic stay as part 
of a workout agreement. In one such case, In re Orange Park South 
Partnership,86 the lender filed a judicial foreclosure action against the 
debtor's real property after the debtor defaulted on two secured notes of 
83. Id. at 31. 
84. Id. at 30. 
85. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 9 (1977); see also In 
re Silverman, 13 B.R. 72, 75 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) ("If a party to a stipulation can 
unilaterally waive its terms whenever the circumstances change in that party's favor, the 
beneficial activity of negotiation and settlement will cease."). 
86. 79 B.R. 79 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987). 
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the lender.87 Subsequently, in an attempt to work out the debtor's 
:financial obligations to the lender, the two parties entered into a 
stipulated judgment in which the lender agreed to postpone the maturity 
date of the two notes. In exchange, the debtor agreed to stipulate, 
among other things, that he would admit the :filing as being totally 
unfounded, a mere delaying tactic, if he subsequently :filed for bankrupt-
cy. As part of the stipulation, the debtor also conceded that he had no 
equity in the subject property.88 The debtor later failed to pay off the 
obligations on the newly agreed-upon maturity date.89 Four days prior 
to the scheduled foreclosure sale, the debtor filed a bankruptcy 
petition.90 
In dismissing the case, the court rejected the debtor's contention that 
the pre-petition stipulation should not be enforced. The court found that 
"there is absolutely nothing in this record which would warrant the 
conclusion that the stipulation was obtained either by coercion, fraud or 
by mutual mistake of material facts which have been traditionally 
recognized as the only valid bases to rescind an agreement."91 
In upholding pre-petition waivers of the stay in the context of a 
workout agreement where the pre-petition workout agreement is an 
otherwise valid and enforceable contract, these courts view the waivers 
no differently than other valid private contractual agreements that have 
been traditionally enforced and recognized under the legal system. 
87. Id. at 80. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 81. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 82. See also In re Aurora Invs., Inc., 134 B.R. 982 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1991): 
There is absolutely nothing in this record to warrant the conclusion that the 
Stipulation was obtained either by coercion, fraud or by mutual mistake of 
material facts which have been traditionally recognized as the only valid bases 
to rescind an agreement, therefore the Debtor cannot escape the legal 
consequences of the stipulation. 
Id. at 986. See also In re Silverman, 13 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981): 
The parties who negotiate . . . stipulations must be aware that they have 
altered their relationships, and will be bound by the terms of the new 
agreement. Furthermore, the court is aware of the importance that 
stipulations and negotiated settlements play in the management of a reorgani-
zation case .... Much of the nature ofreorganization is to negotiate mutually 
advantageous arrangements between the debtor and his creditors. If a party to 
a stipulation can unilaterally waive its terms whenever the circumstances 
change . . . the beneficial activity of negotiation and settlement will cease. 
Id. at 75. 
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL FOR LIMITED ENFORCEABILITY OF PRE-
PETITION WAIVERS OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
A. Introduction 
Pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay in an out-of-court workout 
agreement, while not self-executing, should be given limited enforceabil-
ity in reorganization cases under certain circumstances. This proposed 
model for limited enforceability of pre-petition waivers of the automatic 
stay attempts to strike a balance between the important competing public 
policy interests of the opponents and proponents of such pre-petition 
waivers. 
Courts should enforce pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay on a 
limited basis92 only after determining their validity. Prior to enforce-
ment, courts should find that the waivers are fair, freely entered into, and 
supported by consideration. The burden of proof would then shift to the 
secured creditor to establish a prima facie case that the estate lacks 
equity in the subject property. To safeguard her rights, any interested 
party, except for the debtor or the debtor-in-possession, would have 
standing to challenge the secured creditor's prima facie case. After 
finding that the debtor lacked equity in the subject property, the court 
would hold as a matter of law that, pursuant to the pre-petition waiver 
of the automatic stay, the subject property is unnecessary for an effective 
reorganization. The court would then grant the secured creditor's motion 
for relief from the automatic stay. 
However, a valid pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay would not 
bind an appointed trustee in either a liquidation or a reorganization case 
under the Bankruptcy Code.93 Furthermore, a valid pre-petition waiver 
of the automatic stay would have a conclusive presumptive effect only 
with respect to the second prong of the relief-from-stay standard of 
section 362(d)(2).94 
B. The Model 
92. The proposed model is limited to the context where the creditor, who is 
seeking relief from stay, is a secured creditor who wishes to foreclose on its collateral. 
93. See infra text accompanying notes 107-09. 
94. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1994). 
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1. The Secured Party s Burden of Proof Under the Proposed Model 
In the proposed model, pre-petition waivers would not be self-
executing.95 Rather, they would require court scrutiny and approval, 
which would begin by requiring the secured creditor, a party to the pre-
petition waiver agreement, to file a motion for relief from the automatic 
stay in order to foreclose on its collateral. The secured creditor would 
base the motion for relief on section 362(d)(2)(A) and (B).96 
To satisfy the requirements of section 362( d)(2)(A), a secured creditor 
would have to allege that the estate and the debtor have no equity in the 
subject property. The secured creditor would have to support this 
allegation by providing the court with admissible evidence. Thus, the 
secured creditor would still have to establish a prima facie case of lack 
of equity as it is otherwise obligated to do pursuant to section 362(g)(l) 
of the Bankruptcy Code.97 
Next, in petitions for reorganizations, the secured creditor would have 
to allege, with respect to section 362(d)(2)(B), that the subject property 
is not necessary for an effective reorganization.98 To that end, the 
secured creditor would have to show that the parties stipulated as part of 
a pre-petition agreement that the property is not necessary for an 
effective reorganization. The secured creditor would also have to allege 
facts and provide support sufficient to establish the validity of the pre-
petition waiver agreement, which must meet judicial scrutiny. 
2. Judicial Scrutiny Under the Proposed Model 
(a) Whether the Pre-Petition Waiver is Valid 
In deciding the merits of a motion for relief from the automatic stay 
based upon a pre-petition waiver, the bankruptcy judge must first 
95. See In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 483 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) ("[T]he 
contention that this 'waiver' is enforceable and self-executing is without merit."). 
96. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(2) (1994). The section 
states: "[T]he court shall grant relief from the stay ... with respect to a stay of an act 
against property under subsection (a) of this section, if (A) the debtor does not have an 
equity in such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective 
reorganization." Id. 
97. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2) (1994). The 
section states: "In any hearing under subsection ( d) or ( e) of this section concerning 
relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section- (1) the party 
requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtors equity in 
property .... 
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (1994). 
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determine whether all the conditions precedent have been satisfied: the 
parties freely and fairly entered into the pre-petition waiver agreement, 
the pre-petition waiver agreement is supported by consideration, and the 
pre-petition waiver agreement was entered into in close temporal 
proximity to the bankruptcy petition. When inquiring into whether the 
pre-petition waiver was entered into freely and whether its terms are fair, 
the court should examine several factors, such as whether the debtor 
understood or should have understood the terms of the waiver, and 
whether the waiver was a boilerplate provision in a loan agreement or 
specifically negotiated as part of a workout agreement. The court would 
also question whether the debtor consulted with, or at least had the 
opportunity to consult with, an attorney prior to entering into the pre-
petition waiver agreement.99 
99. See In re Darrell Creek Assocs., L.P., 187 B.R. 908 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995), 
where the court stated: 
Here, it is clear to this Court that the Debtor understood or should have 
understood the [pre-petition] waiver [of the automatic] stay. The principal of 
the Debtor testified that this Agreement was negotiated over a very long period 
of time and that it was an active negotiation. Further, [the Debtor] testified 
that he made comments on certain provisions through the course of this 
negotiation. Clearly, the evidence is undisputed that during at least a portion 
of these negotiations, the Debtor was represented by counsel. The Debtor's 
principal was by his own testimony a sophisticated real estate developer who 
had great experience in this area. The language of the waiver of stay is clear, 
and is clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the Workout Agreement. Debtor 
... acknowledged in the Workout Agreement that they [sic] had read and 
understood its terms. 
Id. at 913. See also In re Riley, 188 B.R. 191, 192 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995) ("[T]he first 
determination is whether the affected party understood the terms and consequences of 
the waiver of stay."); In re McBride Estates, Ltd., 154 B.R. 339, 342 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 
1993) {"This court is in agreement with the principal that a stipulation freely entered 
into by the parties is binding on the parties."); In re Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd., No. 
91-81065HR, 1992 WL 472592, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1991) (in rationalizing its 
decision to enforce a pre-petition waiver provision of the automatic stay, the court 
mentioned that the debtor, having the advice of counsel, agreed to the waiver: "This is 
what debtor specifically agreed to with advice of counsel and offered to [the secured 
creditor] as consideration for its agreement to stop foreclosure proceedings .... "); 
Jeffrey W. Warren & Wendy V.E. England, Pre-Petition Waiver of The Automatic Stay 
Is Not Per Se Enforceable, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 22 (1994) ("[C]ourts typically 
enforce waiver provisions that are conspicuous, negotiated by parties who are experi-
enced, professional and sophisticated in business dealings; negotiated where there is no 
great degree of disparity in bargaining power between the parties; and negotiated where 
the opposing party has an ability to negotiate the contract terms."). 
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The judge must also make a finding as to whether consideration 
supports the pre-petition waiver agreement.100 The judge must exam-
ine whether the debtor received value in exchange for the pre-petition 
waiver of the automatic stay. Determination of value in such cases will 
generally be based on an inquiry as to whether the debtor received, 
under the pre-petition workout agreement, reasonable accommodations 
to restructure the underlying troubled debt. Such accommodation could 
include meaningful forbearance, interest rate adjustment, or maturity date 
extension. 101 
(b) Whether the Estate Has Equity in the Property 
After determining the validity of the pre-petition waiver of the 
automatic stay, the bankruptcy judge would examine whether the movant 
has met the burden of proof in establishing lack of equity. 102 The 
judge should not accept contradictory evidence from the debtor or the 
100. See In re Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. 599 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 
1995), where the court held: 
There was no prepetition waiver in the original loan agreement or under the 
First or Second Modification. The agreement not to object to the motion to 
lift stay was bargained for under the Third Modification . . .. The Debtor 
received a lower interest rate and a five-year extension of the loan . . .. 
Enforcing the Debtor's agreement under these conditions does not violate 
public policy concerns. This is not a situation where a prohibition to opposing 
a motion [for] relief from stay was inserted in the original loan documents. 
The Debtor received significant benefits under the Third Modification and the 
confirmed plan treatment of [the lender]. In exchange for these benefits, the 
Debtor bargained away its right to oppose a motion to lift stay in a subsequent 
bankruptcy proceeding. Accordingly, the court will not consider the objection 
to relief from stay filed by the Debtor. 
Id. at 607. See also Riley, 188 B.R. at 192 ("Generally, forbearance agreements are 
enforceable when the parties have used the contract to afford a mortgagor the 
opportunity to avoid foreclosure .... [E]ach party concedes certain rights in the context 
of such agreements and thereby furthers the public policy in favor of encouraging out 
of court settlements."); Darrell Creek Assocs., L.P., 187 B.R. at 913 ("A further factor 
considered ... is whether there was some surrender of rights by the lender in regards 
to the giving and receiving of the waiver of stay."); Powers, 170 B.R. at 484 ("[T]he 
Court will consider other factors, such as the benefit which the debtor received from the 
workout agreement as a whole .... "); In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817,819 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
1994) ("In the instant case the Debtor received relief under the forbearance agreement 
approximating that which would have been available in a bankruptcy proceeding."); 
Craig H. Averch, Bankruptcy Issues: Emphasizing Drafting Considerations In Protecting 
Against Insolvency (Including Selected Issues in Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies), 
C950 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: REAL ESTATE DEFAULTS, WORKOUTS, AND 
REORGANIZATIONS 303,316 (1994) ("The best case for [prepetition waiver] enforcement 
is the workout situation where consideration (in the form of forbearance, loan 
concessions, or modifications by the lender) is clearly established .... "). 
101. A verch, supra note 100, at 316. 
102. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
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debtor-in-possession on the issue of equity. Because the debtor 
effectively waived protection of the automatic stay before making a 
petition, the court should not permit him to oppose the creditor's 
motion. 103 However, the judge should allow other creditors to file 
motions opposing the secured creditor's motion for relief from the 
stay. 104 These parties could base their opposition on the presence of 
debtor's equity in the subject property, which can be used to make 
distribution to unsecured creditors of the debtor's estate. 105 
103. By precluding the debtor and debtor-in-possession from opposing the creditor's 
motion for relief from stay, the model attempts to minimize the biggest risk facing the 
lender when entering pre-petition workout agreements: that the debtor could take 
advantage of the benefits of the workout agreement and then file a bankruptcy petition 
just prior to the date the agreement requires that he perform. Prohibiting opposition to 
the creditor's motion forces the debtor to share the risks and concessions that he is 
asking the lender to make in a workout agreement. See supra text accompanying notes 
82-84. 
104. This provision attempts to satisfy the concerns of several courts that assert that 
pre-petition waivers inefficiently deplete the estate's assets to the detriment of the 
unsecured creditors. See supra Part II.B. The proposed provision ensures that the 
estate's unsecured creditors have the opportunity to oppose enforcement of the waiver 
if there is equity to distribute. 
Recently, a number of bankruptcy courts have adopted this position. See, e.g., Powers, 
170 B.R. at 483; Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. at 607. In In re Atrium, 
the court held: 
Enforcement of a forbearance agreement does not in itself mean that in all 
bankruptcy cases where one exists, the automatic stay will be lifted. These 
agreements do not oust this Court's Jurisdiction to hear objections to stay relief 
filed by other parties in interest. It simply means that this court will give no 
weight to a Debtor's objection as this conflicts with and is in derogation of the 
previous agreement . . . . [W]hen creditors and parties in interest entitled to 
notice on a motion to lift the stay do not object, the stay becomes lifted as 
though the motion is in default, as the 'objection' of the debtor is meaningless 
and of no effect because of the forbearance agreement. In short, if the 
automatic stay remains it is not because of the debtor. 
Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. at 607 (quoting In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 
at 817, 819-20 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994)). In Cheeks, the court held that the pre-petition 
waiver of stay eliminated the debtor's standing to object to a request for relief from stay 
in that case. However, the court's ruling recognized that the waiver may not be binding 
on third parties, and therefore such parties may have standing to object to relief from 
stay. Cheeks, 167 B.R. at 819-20. 
105. When bringing a motion to enforce the pre-petition waiver, the secured creditor 
would have the burden of establishing that the debtor has no equity in the subject 
property. However, unsecured creditors could file opposing motions. To prevail, they 
would have to present contradictory evidence that showed that the debtor does have 
equity in the subject property. 
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(c) Whether the Property is Necessary for an Effective 
Reorganization 
Having determined that the pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay 
is valid and that the estate has no equity in the subject property, the 
judge would then conclusively presume that the subject property is not 
necessary for an effective reorganization.106 After finding that both 
prongs of section 362(d)(2) have been met, the judge could then grant 
an order for relief from the automatic stay. 
C. Limitations of the Proposed Model 
I. No Binding Effect on Trustee 
Only the secured creditor and the debtor are parties to an agreement 
for pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay. A subsequent, court-
appointed trustee in a debtor's bankruptcy petition is not a party.107 
Therefore, the terms of the pre-petition waiver should not bind the 
trustee.108 Thus, in either a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 petition, a court-
appointed trustee may oppose the secured creditor's motion for relief 
from a stay notwithstanding the pre-petition waiver agreement entered 
between the debtor and the secured creditor. The trustee may center 
opposition on allegations that the estate has equity in the subject 
property, or that the subject property is necessary for an effective 
reorganization, or both. Where the trustee opposes the secured creditor's 
motion for relief on the basis that the property is necessary for an 
effective reorganization, the court shall not conclusively presume that the 
property is unnecessary. Instead, the trustee would have to meet the 
burden of proof in establishing that the property is necessary for an 
effective reorganization. 109 
106. The conclusive presumption lightens the secured creditor's burden in obtaining 
relief. The model provides secured creditors with an important incentive to enter out-of-
court workout agreements. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15. The model also 
ensures that the debtor receives a comparable breathing spell prior to filing for 
bankruptcy. See infra text accompanying notes 117-18. However, the model allows for 
certain circumstances when the court should not make the conclusive presumption. See 
infra text accompanying notes 107-09. 
107. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 1104(a) (1994). 
108. LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 242 (1965) 
("[L]iability may not be imposed by contract upon a stranger to it .... "). 
109. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2) (1994). 
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2. Conclusive Presumption Only In Regard to the Second Prong of 
the Standard for Granting Relief From Stay 
Under the proposed model, a valid pre-petition waiver of the automatic 
stay precludes the debtor from opposing a motion for relief from the 
automatic stay on the basis that the estate has equity in the subject 
property. To prevail in such a motion, the movant must still produce 
evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the estate has no 
equity. 
However, under the proposed model, the second prong of the standard 
for granting relief from stay under section 362(d)(2) will be conclusively 
presumed in favor of the creditor, as long as the pre-petition waiver was 
deemed valid. Thus, upon finding the pre-petition waiver a valid 
agreement as defined in this model, the bankruptcy court would not 
allow the debtor to rebut the presumption that the subject property is not 
necessary for an effective reorganization.110
D. Justification for the Proposed Model of Limited Enforceability of 
Pre-Petition Waivers of the Automatic Stay 
1. Continued Court Monitoring of the Debtor's Reorganization or 
Liquidation Process 
This proposed model strikes a balance between the important interests 
of both opponents and proponents of pre-petition waivers of the 
automatic stay. It provides continued court intervention and involvement 
in granting relief from the automatic stay. By not regarding pre-petition 
waivers of the automatic stay as self-executing, the model preserves the 
bankruptcy judge's important role in monitoring and overseeing the 
debtor's reorganization or liquidation process. Preservation of the 
bankruptcy judge's judicial role in connection with the automatic stay 
provision permits the model to remain consistent with the Bankruptcy 
Code mandate that a bankruptcy judge has the power to grant relief from 
the automatic stay. Under the proposed model, the bankruptcy judge 
still has to make a ruling as to whether· the estate has equity in the 
110. As stated earlier, this conclusive presumption is not binding on a trustee. 
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subject property. Moreover, the bankruptcy judge still has the ultimate 
power to order relief from the automatic stay. 
Furthermore, the modified judicial role adopted by the proposed model 
of scrutinizing pre-petition waiver agreements prevents secured creditors 
from potentially abusing them. Because the model requires close 
examination of whether the pre-petition waiver is fair, entered into 
freely, and supported by consideration, the court will be in a position to 
prevent the enforcement of one-sided and unconscionable pre-petition 
waivers. The court's oversight will function as a control mechanism to 
ensure orderly distribution of the estate, preventing unnecessary 
depletion and inefficient dismemberment. 
2. Safeguards of the Debtor 'S Reorganization Attempts 
The proposed model also provides the debtor with adequate 
safeguards in its reorganization attempts. Bankruptcy Code section 105 
vests the bankruptcy judge with discretionary equitable powers that may 
be exercised to safeguard the debtor's reorganization attempts, enforce-
ability of the pre-petition waiver notwithstanding. 111 If the debtor 
experiences a genuine change in circumstances when filing the 
bankruptcy petition, necessitating the protection of a stay of liquidation 
of the estate, he may seek a temporary restraining order followed by an 
injunction pursuant to section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. The courts 
have interpreted section 105 to mean that if "there is a radical and new 
development which drastically changes the economic picture and the 
value of the collateral, ... it is clear that ... [the bankruptcy] ... Court 
may grant additional relief to the debtor by way of injunctive relief."112 
Judicial discretion in determining the validity of the pre-petition 
waiver provides yet another highly effective safeguard of the debtor's 
reorganization efforts. If the judge believes that the debtor was not 
111. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (A bankruptcy 
court may "issue any order . . . necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
this title."). 
112. B.O.S.S. Partners I v. Tucker (In re B.O.S.S. Partners I), 37 B.R. 348, 351 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984). See also In re Jenkins Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 181 
B.R. 33, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1995), where the court held: 
Id. 
[I]t is not unreasonable to wonder whether the Debtor's circumstances or
market conditions might not have changed during the lengthy period between 
the Debtor's execution of the pre-petition settlement agreement and the filing 
of the bankruptcy petition, thereby undercutting the thrust of the earlier 
representations .... It is again not unreasonable to posit that if the Debtor's 
circumstances have changed, or market conditions have improved, the Debtor's 
acknowledgments to the contrary in a pre-petition settlement agreement two 
years earlier may no longer be valid. 
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given an adequate and meaningful chance to reorganize under the pre-
petition workout agreement, then she may find that the debtor did not 
receive value or real benefit in exchange for the pre-petition waiver. In 
that scenario, the judge would hold that the pre-petition waiver of the 
automatic stay is invalid and unenforceable for a lack of consider-
ation.113 As discussed in the preceding sections, these safeguards 
provide the necessary protection for the debtor's reorganization attempts 
and prevent inefficient depletion of the estate. 
3. Promote Out-Of-Court Settlements 
This proposed model provides secured creditors with strong incentives 
to enter into out-of-court workout agreements through selective 
enforcement of pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay. A secured 
creditor entering into a pre-petition workout agreement with a valid 
waiver provision of the automatic stay significantly enhances his chances 
of quickly prevailing in any subsequent motion for relief from the 
automatic stay. A validly held pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay 
precludes the debtor from producing evidence that the debtor has equity 
in the subject property. 114 Furthermore, the secured creditor is entitled 
to have the second prong of the relief-from-stay standard conclusively 
presumed to be in its favor. 115
Although the pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay does not 
provide a secured creditor with self-executing relief from the stay, the 
proposed model lightens the burden of obtaining such relief. The model 
improves the probability that a secured creditor will enter into an out-of-
court restructuring with the debtor by dramatically reducing the risks 
associated with a pre-petition workout agreement. 116 
4. Protection of the Interests of Other Creditors 
The proposed model also protects and preserves the rights of other 
creditors to a fair distribution of the estate's equity by fostering a 
principle of fair distribution. The model requires the court to scrutinize 
whether the estate has equity in the subject property which can be 
113. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09. 
115. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84. 
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distributed among the unsecured creditors of the estate. This require-
ment ensures that, to the extent that there is equity to distribute among 
unsecured creditors of the estate, the court possesses adequate safeguards 
and control mechanisms to prevent uncontrolled depletion and dismem-
berment of the estate, as well as to provide a fair and equitable 
distribution of such equity. 
5. The Proposed Model Ensures That the Debtor Will Receive a 
Breathing Spell to Reorganize 
The provisions and mechanisms of the proposed model ensure that the 
debtor will receive an adequate breathing spell to reorganize. 117 The 
proposed model requires the bankruptcy judge to conduct an inquiry as 
to whether the pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay was indeed a 
genuine waiver of the stay protection. A pre-petition waiver of the stay 
will be deemed genuine only when, among other things, the waiver is 
supported by appropriate consideration. 
In determining whether the waiver provision is supported by 
appropriate consideration, the court will examine whether the debtor 
enjoyed a breathing spell under the terms of the pre-petition workout 
agreement. 118 By limiting enforcement of pre-petition waivers of the 
automatic stay to circumstances where a genuine out-of-court workout 
agreement was reached, the proposed model attempts to ensure that such 
pre-petition waivers are enforced only in cases where the debtor has 
already received a comparable breathing spell out of court prior to filing 
for bankruptcy. 
By ensuring that a debtor is given at least one genuine breathing spell, 
the proposed model consistently follows the broad policy goals of the 
Bankruptcy Code which provide the debtor with a breathing spell to 
reorganize. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the split of authority continues among the federal courts on the 
issue of the enforceability of pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay, 
lenders remain uncertain and hesitant about entering into a workout 
agreement with a delinquent debtor. While some courts acknowledge 
the valid concerns and important interests of lenders in promoting 
117. Pine points out the importance of the breathing spell to the beleaguered debtor. 
See Pine & Alpern, supra note 48, at 31. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
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certainty in the marketplace, many courts are reluctant to enforce such 
waivers because they fear such waivers impair the debtor's fundamental 
rights under the Bankruptcy Code. 
The proposed model strikes a delicate balance between the important 
interests of the opponents and proponents of enforcing pre-petition 
waivers of the automatic stay. By providing limited enforceability to 
pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay, the courts can promote the 
important policy interests of encouraging consensual out-of-court 
agreements; maintaining judicial scrutiny of relief-from-stay motions; 
providing adequate safeguards for the debtor's reorganization efforts; 
protecting the interests of other creditors; and ensuring that the debtor 
receives an adequate breathing spell to reorganize. 
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